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THE GOODMAN-NGUYEN RELATION WITHIN IMPRECISE
PROBABILITY THEORY
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Abstract. The Goodman-Nguyen relation is a partial order generalising the
implication (inclusion) relation to conditional events. As such, with precise
probabilities it both induces an agreeing probability ordering and is a key
tool in a certain common extension problem. Most previous work involving
this relation is concerned with either conditional event algebras or precise
probabilities. We investigate here its role within imprecise probability theory,
first in the framework of conditional events and then proposing a generalisation
of the Goodman-Nguyen relation to conditional gambles. It turns out that
this relation induces an agreeing ordering on coherent or C-convex conditional
imprecise previsions. In a standard inferential problem with conditional events,
it lets us determine the natural extension, as well as an upper extension. With
conditional gambles, it is useful in deriving a number of inferential inequalities.
Keywords. Goodman-Nguyen relation, imprecise probabilities, imprecise
previsions, natural extension
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1. Introduction
It is well known in probability theory that relations among events determine
elementary probability rules as well as inferential bounds. Take for instance two
non-trivial (i.e. non-impossible, non-certain) events E, F . If we know nothing
else about E, F , any probability assignment P on {E,F} such that P (E) ∈ [0, 1],
P (F ) ∈ [0, 1] is consistent (coherent). Knowing further that E and F are disjoint,
i.e. that E ∧ F = ∅, introduces the constraint P (E) + P (F ) ≤ 1. We can also
infer that P (E ∨ F ) = P (E) + P (F ). This inference would not be necessarily
justified replacing P with a more general uncertainty measure: with a coherent
lower probability P , for instance, we could only state that P (E∨F ) ≥ P (E)+P (F ).
The implication (inclusion) relation E ⇒ F (E ⊂ F ) is the most prominent
example of a relation whose effects should (in principle) be independent of the
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uncertainty measure µ we use. This is because the monotonicity requirement
(1) (E ⇒ F )→ µ(E) ≤ µ(F )
is a very minimal one. In fact, E ⇒ F means that F is certainly true whenever E
is true, but might possibly be true even in cases when E is false: then obviously
F must be at least as likely as E. In fact, (1) holds also when µ is a coherent
lower/upper probability, or a capacity. In the latter case, it is generally taken as
one of the defining properties of capacities.
The implication relation ‘⇒’ also plays a role in the following extension problem,
a special case of de Finetti’s Fundamental Theorem [6]: given a coherent probability
P on the set A(IP ) of all events (logically) dependent on a given partition IP , which
are its coherent extensions to an additional event E /∈ A(IP )? The well known
answer is that P (E) must be chosen in a closed interval, P (E∗) ≤ P (E) ≤ P (E∗).
Here the events E∗, E∗ are defined using the implication relation (see Definition
5) and belong to A(IP ). Hence, P (E) is bounded by the previous assessment on
A(IP ).
A generalisation of the implication relation to conditional events, the Goodman-
Nguyen (in short: GN) relation ≤GN was apparently first introduced in [10], and
some of its implications for precise conditional probabilities were studied in [2, 3, 13].
The main purpose of this paper is to further explore the relevance of the GN
relation in more general cases, extending the previous work in [18]. Section 2
recalls some preliminary material, including a survey of known facts about the GN
relation in Section 2.3. In Section 3, the role of the GN relation with either coherent
according to Williams’ definition (W-coherent) or C-convex imprecise probabilities
is studied. Proposition 2 ensures that the generalisation of equation (1), i.e.
(2) A|B ≤GN C|D → µ(A|B) ≤ µ(C|D)
holds for such probabilities. Section 3.1 considers extensions of W-coherent or C-
convex ‘full’ probabilities; such ‘full’ probabilities are defined on all events A|B
such that both A and B (B 6= ∅) are logically dependent on some given parti-
tion. Proposition 4 characterises consistent extensions on an additional event C|D;
Propositions 5 and 6 characterise the natural and convex natural extensions on
an arbitrary set of additional events. Proposition 7 regards the upper extensions,
Proposition 8 the special case of precise probabilities. The investigation of the GN
relation with conditional gambles starts in Section 4.1 with a discussion of its bet-
ting interpretation in the standard case of events. Some aspects not emphasised
in the previous literature are highlighted. This justifies, together with Proposition
9, our extension (Definition 6) of the GN relation in Section 4.2. The extension
induces an agreeing ordering on several types of conditional imprecise previsions,
as shown in Section 4.3. A number of special inequalities are also derived in Section
4.4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we first fix some notation and definitions to be used throughout
the paper (Section 2.1). We then briefly recall some basic facts from the theory of
imprecise probabilities that will be needed in the sequel (Section 2.2). For in-depth
studies of these issues, cf. [6, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22]. The Goodman-Nguyen relation
and known related issues are surveyed in Section 2.3.
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2.1. Notation and Definitions. In the sequel, following [6, 10] and others, we
employ the logical rather than the set theoretical notation for operations with
events. Let IP be a partition, i.e. a set of pairwise disjoint events whose logical
sum (union) is the sure event Ω. An event E is logically dependent on IP iff E is a
logical sum of events of IP , E =
∨
ω∈IP : ω⇒E
ω. The set A(IP ) of all events logically
dependent on IP is a field (also called the power set of IP ).
When dealing with unconditional events, probabilities and other uncertainty
measures are often assessed on A(IP ), where IP is given. In general, we may think
of eliciting an uncertainty measure on an arbitrary set of events D = {Ei : i ∈ I}.
The set D is generally not a partition nor the power set of some partition, but
generates a partition IPg. The elements of this partition are given by all the logical
products
∧
i∈I E
′
i, where for each i ∈ I the symbol E′i can be replaced by either
event Ei or its negation ¬Ei. Note that some products
∧
i∈I E
′
i may be impossible.
The events in D belong to A(IPg).
A random number X is also described by a (not uniquely identified) partition.
Typically, we consider for this the canonical partition IPX . Its events are (X = x),
i.e. IPX is the partition of all possible distinct values x of X. Yet, we might be
bound to refer to other, more refined, partitions. For instance, when describing two
random variables X, Y at the same time, we may refer to the partition IPX,Y whose
events are (X = x ∧ Y = y), for all jointly possible values of X, Y . This is an
example of product partition (other instances will appear in some proofs in Section
3). In general, given two partitions IP , IP ′ with generic elements, respectively,
ω, ω′, their product partition is IP ∧ IP ′ = {ω ∧ ω′ : ω ∈ IP, ω′ ∈ IP ′}. Hence
IPX,Y = IPX ∧ IPY . The product partition IP ∧ IP ′ is more refined than both IP and
IP ′ (hence, if E ∈ A(IP ), then also E ∈ A(IP ∧ IP ′)). Note that some ω ∧ω′ are, in
general, impossible: the special case ω ∧ ω′ 6= ∅, ∀ω ∈ IP , ∀ω′ ∈ IP ′ characterizes
the logical independence of IP and IP ′. We shall not necessarily assume logical
independence.
The random numbers we shall deal with in the sequel are all bounded, i.e. they
are gambles.
In our framework, conditional events and gambles will be needed. In terms of a
truth table, a conditional event A|B can be thought of as true, when A and B are
true, false when A is false and B true, undefined when B is false. It ensues that
A|B and A ∧B|B have the same logical values, i.e. A|B = A ∧B|B.
Given a partition IP (describing X), a conditional gamble X|B, B ∈ A(IP )−{∅},
takes up the values X(ω), for ω ∈ IP , ω ⇒ B, is undefined for ω ⇒ ¬B. When
B = Ω, X|Ω = X is an unconditional gamble. The indicator IA of an event A is the
simplest non-trivial gamble. We shall often denote A and its indicator IA with the
same letter A. Note that A⇒ B is equivalent to IA ≤ IB : the implication relation
between events corresponds to the weak inequality between their indicators.
2.2. Imprecise Previsions. A lower prevision P on a set S of conditional gambles
is a map P : S 7−→ R. If S has the property X|B ∈ S → −X|B ∈ S, the
conjugate upper prevision of P is defined as P (X|B) = −P (−X|B). Conjugacy
allows employing lower or alternatively upper previsions only.
Several consistency concepts for lower/upper previsions have been introduced in
the literature. An important one is the following:
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Definition 1. A lower prevision P : S 7−→ R is W-coherent iff, for all n ∈ N,
∀X0|B0, . . . , Xn|Bn ∈ S, ∀ s0, s1, . . . , sn real and non-negative, defining B =∨n
i=0Bi and G =
∑n
i=1 siBi(Xi−P (Xi|Bi))−s0B0(X0−P (X0|B0)), the following
condition holds: sup(G|B) ≥ 0.
This is essentially Williams’ definition of coherence [22], as restated in [17]. It is
equivalent to Walley’s definition 7.1.4(b) in [20] if S is made up of a finite number
of conditional gambles, each with finitely many values. If X|B = X|Ω = X,
∀X|B ∈ S, it reduces to Walley’s (unconditional) coherence ([20], Sec. 2.5.4 (a)).
Like the other consistency concepts we recall in this section, Definition 1 is ax-
iomatic, but is customarily given an interpretation in terms of betting schemes. To
outline it, recall that the conditional gamble G|B is the gain from betting in favour
of X1|B1, . . . , Xn|Bn and against X0|B0 at stakes s1, . . . , sn and s0 respectively.
The bet regarding Xi|Bi (i = 0, . . . , n) is called off iff Bi is false. Conditioning G
on B requires that at least one bet is effective.
A weaker concept than W-coherence is that of convex conditional lower prevision.
It may be obtained from Definition 1 by introducing the extra convexity constraint∑n
i=1 si = s0 (> 0).
Definition 2. A lower prevision P : S 7−→ R is convex iff, for all n ∈ N,
∀X0|B0, . . . , Xn|Bn ∈ S, ∀ s0, s1, . . . , sn real and non-negative, such that
∑n
i=1 si =
s0 > 0, defining B =
∨n
i=0Bi and G =
∑n
i=1 siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi)) − s0B0(X0 −
P (X0|B0)), the following condition holds: sup(G|B) ≥ 0.
P is centered convex (C–convex) when it is convex and X|B ∈ S implies that
0|B ∈ S and P (0|B) = 0.
These previsions were studied in [15] and are related to certain kinds of risk
measures. Convex previsions that are not necessarily centered have been sometimes
considered in the literature, for instance in [8] with the corresponding concept of
(unconditional) convex risk measure. C-convex previsions ensure however definitely
better consistency properties (cf. also the discussion following Proposition 10). We
shall mainly refer to them in what follows.
Precise conditional previsions may be defined similarly [12], extending de Finetti’s
notion of coherence for unconditional previsions [6]:
Definition 3. P : S 7−→ R is a dF-coherent conditional prevision iff, for all n ∈ N,
∀ X1|B1, . . . , Xn|Bn ∈ S, ∀ si ∈ R (i = 1, . . . , n), defining G =
∑n
i=1 siBi(Xi −
P (Xi|Bi)), B =
∨n
i=1Bi, it holds that sup(G|B) ≥ 0.
Remark 1. C-convexity is more general than W-coherence and dF-coherence. Hence,
the properties of C-convex previsions hold for W-coherent and dF-coherent previ-
sions too. They apply to Walley’s coherence too, whenever it is equivalent to
W-coherence. This is the case, for instance, of properties involving finitely many
events, like Proposition 2. 
It is well known that dF-coherent (W-coherent, C-convex) previsions on S allow
for extensions on any set of conditional gambles S ′ ⊃ S which are dF-coherent
(W-coherent, C-convex, respectively). The special extension problem in the next
lemma will be needed in the proof of Proposition 4.
Lemma 1. Let µ(·|·) be a dF-coherent prevision (alternatively, a W-coherent or
C-convex lower or upper prevision) on S. Suppose that µ′,µ′′ are two dF-coherent
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(alternatively, W-coherent or C-convex) extensions of µ on S ∪ {X|D}, and that
µ′(X|D) = m, µ′′(X|D) = M > m. Then, any extension µext of µ on S ∪ {X|D}
such that µext(X|D) ∈ [m,M ] is dF-coherent (respectively, W-coherent, C-convex).
Proof. The consistency of µext may be proved by checking Definitions 1, 2 and 3,
or using conjugacy in the upper prevision case. The procedure is essentially the
same, and we exemplify it when µ is a C-convex lower prevision on S. Then, by
Definition 2, µext is C-convex on S ∪ {X|D} iff ∀X0|B0, . . . , Xn|Bn ∈ S ∪ {X|D},
∀s0, . . . , sn real and non–negative, such that
∑n
i=1 si = s0 > 0,
(3) supG|B = sup{
n∑
i=1
siBi(Xi−µext(Xi|Bi))−s0B0(X0−µext(X0|B0))|B} ≥ 0.
Clearly, there is nothing to prove if X0|B0, . . . , Xn|Bn ∈ S. If not, let us call s the
stake regarding X|D.1 Then, we write G|B = sD(X − µext(X|D)) + R|B, where
R consists of the remaining terms in G.
If s ≥ 0, G|B ≥ sD(X−M)+R|B = G′′|B. Therefore, supG|B ≥ supG′′|B ≥ 0,
the last inequality holding because the gain G′′|B concerns the extension µ′′ of µ.
If s < 0, G|B ≥ sD(X −m) + R|B = G′|B. Since G′|B is a gain regarding µ′,
the conclusion is the same. 
Among the W-coherent extensions on S ′ ⊃ S of a lower prevision P , the natural
extension E is its least-committal one. This means that for any Q such that Q is
W-coherent on S ′ and Q = P on S, it holds that Q ≥ E (E is dominated by Q).
The concept of C-convex natural extension is analogous for C-convex previsions.
The natural extension (the C-convex natural extension) always exists and is unique
[15, 17, 22].
Sometimes one may be interested in searching for an extension U of P with
opposite features, i.e. ensuring that no (W-coherent, alternatively C-convex) ex-
tension Q of P is such that Q ≥ U . This is the notion of upper extension, originally
developed in [21]. The upper extension is generally not unique, and its practical
computation may be not immediate. We shall meet a case of upper extension in
Section 3.1.
A property of W-coherent previsions is the (weak) product rule, proven in [16]:
Proposition 1. Let P be W-coherent on S ⊃ {AX|B,A|B,X|A ∧ B}. Then,
necessarily:
a) if P (X|A ∧B) > 0, then
P (AX|B) ≥ P (A|B) · P (X|A ∧B)(4)
b) if P (X|A ∧B) < 0, then
P (AX|B) ≤ P (A|B) · P (X|A ∧B)(5)
c) P (AX|B) = 0 iff P (A|B) · P (X|A ∧B) = 0
In the consistency concepts above, the measure µ is a (lower, upper or precise)
probability if, for any X|B ∈ S, X is (the indicator of) an event. In all such cases,
the following are necessary consistency conditions:
(6) µ(A|B) ∈ [0; 1], µ(∅|B) = 0, µ(B|B) = 1.
1Since X0|B0, . . . , Xn|Bn need not be distinct, if X|D is present more than once s is the stake
of the sum of the terms where it appears.
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In general, results for upper probabilities follow from those for lower probabilities
by the conjugacy equality P (A|B) = 1− P (¬A|B).
2.3. The Goodman-Nguyen Relation.
Definition 4. (Goodman–Nguyen relation.) We say that A|B ≤GN C|D iff
(7) A ∧B ⇒ C ∧D and ¬C ∧D ⇒ ¬A ∧B.
Example 1. Some simple examples of GN-related events:
a) If A⇒ C ⇒ D ⇒ B, then A|B ≤GN C|D;
b) A|B ≤GN C|B iff A ∧B ⇒ C ∧B;
c) ∅|B ≤GN C|D iff ¬C ∧D ⇒ B.
The GN relation was apparently first introduced by Goodman and Nguyen in
[10]. In that paper, the focus is on defining the operations ∧, ∨ with conditional
events, which is done as follows:
(8)
A|B ∧ C|D = (A ∧B ∧ C ∧D)|[(¬A ∧B) ∨ (¬C ∧D) ∨ (B ∧D)]
A|B ∨ C|D = [(A ∧B) ∨ (C ∧D)]|[(A ∧B) ∨ (C ∧D) ∨ (B ∧D)]
The relation ≤GN is then defined as
(9) A|B ≤GN C|D iff A|B = A|B ∧ C|D iff C|D = C|D ∨A|B
and it is stated without proof that this definition is equivalent to Definition 4. The
equivalence is discussed at length in [13], where it is also asserted that equations
(8) can already be deduced from the truth tables presented by de Finetti in [4].
While de Finetti does not seem to have considered explicitly the GN relation, the
intuition behind Definition 4 has been explained in the literature resorting to betting
arguments, much in his style (cf. [13] and also [14], where ≤GN is termed ‘betting
order’).
In fact, (7) states that whenever we bet both on A|B and on C|D (iff B ∧ D
is true), the following holds: if we win the bet on A|B, we also win the bet on
C|D (because A ∧B ⇒ C ∧D); and if we loose the bet on C|D, we also loose the
bet on A|B (because of ¬C ∧ D ⇒ ¬A ∧ B). When B = D = Ω, just one of the
implications in (7) is needed, because of the tautology A ⇒ C ↔ ¬C ⇒ ¬A. We
shall reconsider and broaden the betting interpretation in Section 4.1.
The GN relation was a secondary item, at best, in Goodman and Nguyen’s
work on conditional event algebras. Recently [9], it has been related, together with
Adam’s quasi-conjunction, to probabilistic entailment under coherence.
In this paper, we do not follow these lines of research, but investigate rather the
relevance of ≤GN in imprecise probability theory. In fact, the recalled interpretation
of ≤GN suggests that (2) should hold for a generic, but consistent uncertainty
measure µ. In the case that µ is a conditional probability P , (2) was stated without
proof in [10] and proven in [11] (assuming P defined on a structured set, termed AC
in Definition 5). Equation (2) was proved also in [2] (under general assumptions
for P ) and independently (in a less general case) in [13]. Propositions 2 and 10 in
this paper establish (2) for imprecise measures.
The GN relation in extension problems is explored in [3] in the context of precise
probabilities. It is shown there that, given a dF-coherent probability P on a finite
set of conditional events, the bounds for its coherent extensions on one additional
event C|D depend on the values of P on two events. The two events are determined
by the GN relation and are termed (C|D)∗ and (C|D)∗ in equation (15).
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In Section 3.1 we study more general extension problems, on arbitrary sets of
events and for precise or imprecise probability assessments.
3. Effects of the GN Relation on Imprecise Probability Assessments
The GN relation induces a corresponding ordering, satisfying equation (2), on
C-convex lower/upper conditional probabilities, and therefore (Remark 1) on W-
and Walley-coherent imprecise probabilities, and on dF-coherent probabilities:
Proposition 2. Let µ be a C-convex lower (or upper) probability defined on D ⊇
{A|B,C|D}. Then, A|B ≤GN C|D implies µ(A|B) ≤ µ(C|D).
Proposition 2 was proved in [18]. It is a special case of Proposition 10, proved
in Section 4.3.
Example 2. In several common situations, we may be interested in evaluating an
event A conditioned on different, but increasingly more precise assumptions. This
originates a sequence of conditional events A|Bn, with the conditioning events Bn,
n = 0, 1, . . ., totally ordered by implication.
Does this special structure imply some ordering, according to the GN relation,
among the conditional events A|Bn? To answer this question, let us compare A|B0
with A|B1, assuming that B1 ⇒ B0.
There are three possible situations:
a) A|B0 ≤GN A|B1 iff A ∧B0 ∧ ¬B1 = ∅.
To see this, apply Definition 4: A|B0 ≤GN A|B1 iff A ∧ B0 ⇒ A ∧ B1
and ¬A ∧ B1 ⇒ ¬A ∧ B0. Since B1 ⇒ B0, we get A|B0 ≤GN A|B1 iff
A ∧B0 ⇒ A ∧B1 iff ¬A ∧B0 ∧ ¬B1 = ∅.
b) A|B1 ≤GN A|B0 iff ¬A ∧B0 ∧ ¬B1 = ∅.
The proof of b) is in line with that of a), noting that this time the first
implication in Definition 4 is always true.
c) Neither A|B0 ≤GN A|B1 nor A|B1 ≤GN A|B0 iff (A ∧ B0 ∧ ¬B1 6= ∅ and
¬A ∧B0¬B1 6= ∅).
Let now µ be a C-convex probability, either lower or upper. In cases a) and b),
Proposition 2 lets us derive an inequality linking µ(A|B0) and µ(A|B1). For in-
stance, with case a) we get
(10) A ∧B0 ∧ ¬B1 = ∅→ µ(A|B0) ≤ µ(A|B1).
The inequality in (10) is already known in some special cases. In particular, let
A ⇒ B1 ⇒ B0 (see Figure 1), which implies that A ∧ B0 ∧ ¬B1 = ∅. Then
Figure 1. Example 2, a).
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the inequality follows from the product rule P (A|B0) = P (A|B1)P (B1|B0) when
µ is a dF-coherent probability, while it was obtained in a different way in [19] for
W-coherent probabilities.
Remark 2. (GN-unrelated events.) As appears from Example 1, c) and Example 2,
c), several conditional events are not GN-related. It may be so even in the presence
of implication relationships between either their conditioned events (∅ implies any
event in Example 1, c)), or their conditioning ones (B0 ⇒ B1 in Example 2, c)).
Further, since B1 ⇒ B0 induces µ(B1) ≤ µ(B0) for any monotone measure µ,
one might suspect that the agreeing ordering µ(A|B1) ≤ µ(A|B0) should hold with
GN-related A|B1 and A|B0. We have seen instead in Example 2, b) that this is not
always the case. Yet, the following holds: if A is arbitrary, while B1 ⇒ B0, then
(11) µ(A ∧B1|B0) ≤ µ(A|B1).
Inequality (11) follows from Proposition 2, since A∧B1|B0 ≤GN A∧B1|B1 = A|B1.

Remark 3. (Relationship with conditional implication.) The GN relation is linked to
conditional implication as follows. Recall that the conditional implication A|H ⇒
B|H may be defined as A ∧ H ⇒ B ∧ H (or alternatively, by the truth table of
A⇒ B, provided that H is true).
Suppose then A|B ≤GN C|D. From (A ∧B ⇒ C ∧D)→ [(A ∧B) ∧ (B ∧D)⇒
(C ∧D)∧ (B ∧D)]↔ (A∧B ∧D ⇒ C ∧B ∧D)↔ (A|B ∧D ⇒ C|B ∧D), we get
that
(12) A|B ≤GN C|D → (A|B ∧D ⇒ C|B ∧D).
Similar computations using ¬C ∧D ⇒ ¬A ∧B show that
(13) A|B ≤GN C|D → (¬C|B ∧D ⇒ ¬A|B ∧D).
Hence, the GN relation implies the two conditional implications in (12) and (13).
As a follow up, note that, for a dF-coherent P
(14) A|B ≤GN C|D → P (A ∧D|B) ≤ P (C ∧D|B).
In fact, from (12), A|B ∧ D ⇒ C|B ∧ D ensures P (A|B ∧ D) ≤ P (C|B ∧ D).
Multiplying both terms by P (D|B) gives the inequality in (14).
The conditional implications in (12), (13) jointly have the same betting interpre-
tation recalled in Section 2.3 for the GN relation. However, the GN relation may
compare events with different conditioning events. This interesting differentiating
feature is useful, for instance, in the problems of the next section. 
3.1. The GN Relation in Extension Problems. We shall discuss now gener-
alisation of the extension problem presented in the Introduction.
Definition 5. Let IP be any partition. Given an event E, define its inner event
E∗ =
∨
e∈IP : e⇒E
e and its outer event E∗ =
∨
e∈IP : e∧E 6=∅
e. Define further AC =
AC(IP ) = {A|B : A,B ∈ A(IP ), B 6= ∅}, and for an arbitrary C|D (C|D 6= ∅|D,
C|D 6= D|D), m(C|D) = {A|B ∈ AC(IP ) : A|B ≤GN C|D}, M(C|D) = {A|B ∈
AC(IP ) : C|D ≤GN A|B}.
Note that the definitions of inner and outer event are not independent: E∗ =
¬((¬E)∗). It is easy to see that
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Proposition 3. The sets m, M are non-empty and have, respectively, a maximum
(C|D)∗ and a minimum (C|D)∗ conditional event w.r.t. ≤GN,
(15)
(C|D)∗ = (C ∧D)∗|[(C ∧D)∗ ∨ (¬C ∧D)∗],
(C|D)∗ = (C ∧D)∗|[(C ∧D)∗ ∨ (¬C ∧D)∗].
Analogously to the unconditional case, (C|D)∗ may be termed the inner event
and (C|D)∗ the outer event of C|D. Both are made up of unconditional inner and
outer events, by Definition 5. For instance, (C ∧D)∗ =
∨
e∈IP : e⇒C∧D
e, (¬C ∧D)∗ =∨
e∈IP : e∧¬C∧D 6=∅
e.
A graphical illustration of (C|D)∗ is supplied in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The unconditional events forming (C|D)∗.
Suppose now that an uncertainty measure µ is assessed on the set of conditional
events AC(IP ) (Definition 5). We wish to extend µ to an arbitrary event C|D. The
non-triviality assumption C|D 6= ∅|D, C|D 6= D|D, already introduced in Defini-
tion 5, is assumed also in the sequel. It rules out limiting cases whose extension is
already known by (6).
It holds that
Proposition 4. Let µ(·|·) be a dF-coherent probability, or alternatively a W-
coherent or C-convex lower or upper probability on AC(IP ). Any of its extensions
on AC(IP ) ∪ {C|D} is, respectively, a dF-coherent probability, or a W-coherent or
C-convex lower or upper probability if and only if µ(C|D) ∈ [µ((C|D)∗);µ((C|D)∗)].
Proof. The only if part follows at once from Proposition 2: (C|D)∗ ≤GN C|D ≤GN
(C|D)∗ implies µ((C|D)∗) ≤ µ(C|D) ≤ µ((C|D)∗).
The proof of the if implication consists of two parts:
a) Prove that both µ(C|D) = µ((C|D)∗) and µ(C|D) = µ((C|D)∗) are con-
sistent extensions of µ.
b) Apply Lemma 1.
To prove a), define µ(C|D) = µ((C|D)∗) and let G|K be a generic gain concerning
µ on AC(IP ) ∪ {C|D}. We shall check that the maximum of G|K is non-negative.
The gain G|K involves bets regarding C|D and (no or) finitely many events of
AC(IP ), call them A1|B1, . . . , An|Bn for notational simplicity. Here n ≥ 0, whilst
C|D is necessarily included into the bets. If not, we are left with a bet on AC(IP )
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only. This would immediately imply maxG|K ≥ 0, since µ is already known to be
consistent on AC(IP ).
Defining G0 =
∑n
i=1 siBi(Ai − µ(Ai|Bi)), we may write
G = sD(C − µ((C|D)∗)) +G0, K = D ∨
n∨
i=1
Bi.
The term G0 gathers the addends in G referring to bets regarding events in AC(IP ).
We shall consider for each G|K an auxiliary gain Gaux|Kaux, such that
i) maxGaux|Kaux ≥ 0.
ii) The set of values that Gaux|Kaux may take is a subset of the possible values
of G|K.
Clearly, i) and ii) jointly imply maxG|K ≥ 0, hence the first part of a).
The auxiliary gain Gaux|Kaux is defined as follows:
Gaux = sD
m(Cm − µ((C|D)∗)) +G0, Kaux = Dm ∨
n∨
i=1
Bi
where
Cm = (C ∧D)∗,
Dm = (C ∧D)∗ ∨ (¬C ∧D)∗.(16)
In equation (16), we simply redefine the events forming (C|D)∗. Therefore, Cm|Dm =
(C|D)∗.
Note that G and hence Gaux may be gains for a dF-coherent, W-coherent or C-
convex upper or lower µ by putting suitable additional constraints on s, s1, . . . , sn.
Our proof is independent of which constraints are possibly added, hence holds in
all the above assumptions for µ.
Proof of i). The inequality maxGaux|Kaux ≥ 0 follows from the assumed con-
sistency (dF-coherence, etc.) of µ on AC(IP ). In fact, all the events in Gaux|Kaux
belong to AC(IP ).
Proof of ii). We preliminarily note that Gaux|Kaux is defined on the elements of
IP implying Kaux, whilst an appropriate partition to evaluate G|K is the product
partition IP ′ = IP ∧ {C ∧D,¬C ∧D,¬D}. Clearly, IP ′ is finer than IP .
We prove that ∀e ∈ IP such that e⇒ Kaux there exists ω ∈ IP ′ such that ω ⇒ K
and G(ω) = Gaux(e), i.e. G|K(ω) = Gaux|Kaux(e).
It is useful for this to observe that any atom e of IP can be written as the logical
sum of at most three non-impossible atoms of IP ′:
(17) e = (e ∧ C ∧D) ∨ (e ∧ ¬C ∧D) ∨ (e ∧ ¬D).
Writing Kaux as the sum of two disjoint events, Kaux = D
m ∨ (∨ni=1Bi ∧ ¬Dm),
we correspondingly consider two cases:
a1) Let e ∈ IP be such that e⇒ ∨ni=1Bi ∧ ¬Dm (⇒ ¬Dm).
Then e ∧ Dm = ∅ and, therefore, also e ∧ ¬C ∧ D = ∅. Hence, (17)
implies e = (e∧C∧D)∨ (e∧¬D). Note that ω = e∧¬D is non-impossible,
because ω = ∅ would imply e = e ∧ C ∧D ⇒ (C ∧D)∗ ⇒ Dm, which is a
contradiction to the assumption. Furthermore, ω ⇒ e⇒ ∨ni=1Bi ⇒ K. It
is now immediate to check that Gaux(e) = G(ω)(= G0(e)) and, therefore,
Gaux|Kaux(e) = G|K(ω).
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a2) Let e ∈ IP be such that e⇒ Dm = (C ∧D)∗ ∨ (¬C ∧D)∗.
If e⇒ (C ∧D)∗ = Cm, then e⇒ C ∧D. Hence, e = e ∧ C ∧D in (17).
Consequently, e is also an element of IP ′ and e⇒ K. This means that also
G|K is defined at e and, since Gaux(e) = G(e) = s(1−µ((C|D)∗)) +G0(e),
we have that Gaux|Kaux(e) = G|K(e).
If e⇒ (¬C ∧D)∗, then at least the component ω′ = e ∧ ¬C ∧D of e in
equation (17) is non-impossible and implies K. Then Gaux(e) = G(ω
′) =
−sµ((C|D)∗) +G0(e). Therefore, Gaux|Kaux(e) = G|K(ω′).
Thus we have proven ii).
The proof of the second part of a) is quite analogous. Putting now µ(C|D) =
µ((C|D)∗), we consider a generic gain G′|K concerning µ on AC ∪ {C|D}, with
G′ = sD(C−µ((C|D)∗))+G0. We define further an auxiliary gain Gaux|Kaux, with
Gaux = sDM (CM−µ((C|D)∗))+G1, Kaux = DM∨
∨n
i=1Bi, where C
M = (C∧D)∗,
DM = (C ∧ D)∗ ∨ (¬C ∧ D)∗. Then, the analogues of i), ii) can be proven. For
ii), two major alternatives are to be considered, as suggested by the decomposition
Kaux = DM ∨ (∨ni=1Bi ∧ ¬DM ). We omit the details.
Finally, the thesis of the Proposition follows by b). 
In the general case of extensions on an arbitrary set of conditional events, the
following proposition holds:
Proposition 5. Let P (P ) be a W-coherent, respectively C-convex lower (upper)
probability defined on AC . Let also E be an arbitrary set of conditional events.
Then, the extension of P (P ) on AC∪E, such that P (C|D) = P ((C|D)∗) (P (C|D) =
P ((C|D)∗)), ∀C|D ∈ E, is a W-coherent, respectively C-convex lower (upper) prob-
ability.
Proof. We prove the part of the thesis concerning P , the one regarding P being
quite analogous.
a) We start with a preliminary fact: let C|D ∈ E , s ≥ 0, and define
(18) g = sD(C − P (Cm|Dm)), gm = sDm(Cm − P (Cm|Dm)),
where Cm and Dm are defined in (16).
Then g ≥ gm.
To prove this, note firstly that both g and gm are defined on the product
partition {C ∧ D,¬C ∧ D,¬D} ∧ {Cm ∧ Dm,¬Cm ∧ Dm,¬Dm}. Three
elements of this partition are impossible, namely e1 = C
m ∧Dm ∧¬C ∧D,
e2 = C
m ∧ Dm ∧ ¬D, e3 = ¬Dm ∧ ¬C ∧ D. In fact, Cm ∧ Dm = Cm =
(C∧D)∗ ⇒ C∧D by the definition of Cm, hence e1 = e2 = ∅. Also, e3 = ∅:
from the definition of Dm, ¬C ∧ D ⇒ Dm, that is ¬C ∧ D ∧ ¬Dm = ∅.
The inequality g ≥ gm follows by comparing the values of g and gm at the
remaining 6 atoms. For instance, at e4 = ¬Cm ∧ Dm ∧ C ∧ D, g(e4) =
s(1− P (Cm|Dm)) > −sP (Cm|Dm) = gm(e4). The other cases are similar.
b) Now take a generic gain G in the definition of W-coherence or C-convexity
of the extension of P on AC ∪ E ,
(19) G = g0 +
r∑
h=1
gh +
n∑
k=1
tkBk(Ak − P (Ak|Bk)).
Here gh = shDh(Ch − P ((Ch|Dh)∗)) and Ch|Dh ∈ E (h = 0, . . . , r), whilst
Ak|Bk ∈ AC (k = 1, . . . , n).
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Without introducing any real restriction, we may suppose that the only
stake that can (with W-coherence) or must (with C-convexity) be negative
is either s0 or one among t1, t2, . . . , tn. The remaining stakes are necessarily
non-negative.
Next to this, we compare any G with its ‘auxiliary’ gain
(20) Gaux = g0 +
r∑
h=1
gmh +
n∑
k=1
tkBk(Ak − P (Ak|Bk)),
where gmh = shD
m
h (C
m
h − P (Cmh |Dmh )). The events Cmh , Dmh are derived
from Ch, Dh (h = 1, . . . , r), exactly like C
m, Dm from C, D in (16). Hence,
Cmh |Dmh = (Ch|Dh)∗.
G and Gaux are defined on the product partition IPaux = IP ∧
∧r
h=o{Ch∧
Dh,¬Ch ∧Dh,¬Dh}, and we easily get, by a),
(21) G ≥ Gaux.
c) Define K = D0 ∨
∨r
h=1Dh ∨
∨n
k=1Bk, Kaux = D0 ∨
∨r
h=1D
m
h ∨
∨n
k=1Bk.
We are now going to prove that maxG|K ≥ 0.
Note that maxGaux|Kaux ≥ 0 by Proposition 4 and Definition 1 (W-
coherence) or Definition 2 (C-convexity). In fact, all events in Gaux except
C0|D0 belong to AC(IP ).
We define further the events K1aux = D0 ∨
∨r
h=1(D
m
h ∧Dh) ∨
∨n
k=1Bk,
K2aux =
∨r
h=1(D
m
h ∧ ¬(Dh)) ∧ ¬(K1aux). They are clearly disjoint and such
that Kaux = K
1
aux ∨K2aux.
Recall that maxGaux|Kaux = max{maxGaux|K1aux,maxGaux|K2aux}≥
0. From this, we distinguish two cases to evaluate maxG|K.
c1) maxGaux|Kaux = maxGaux|K1aux.
Since K1aux ⇒ K and using (21), we get maxG|K ≥ maxG|K1aux ≥
maxGaux|K1aux = maxGaux|Kaux ≥ 0.
c2) maxGaux|Kaux = maxGaux|K2aux.
Since Cmh = (Ch ∧Dh)∗ ⇒ Ch ∧Dh ⇒ Dh and Cmh ⇒ Dmh , we easily
get Cmh ⇒ Dmh ∧ Dh ⇒ K1aux. Hence, Cmh ∧ K2aux = ∅, because
K1aux∧K2aux = ∅. It follows Gaux|K2aux = −
∑r
h=1 shP (C
m
h |Dmh ) ≤ 0,
since sh ≥ 0 (h = 1, . . . , r). Hence, necessarily maxGaux|Kaux =
maxGaux|K2aux = 0, meaning that
(22) shP (C
m
h |Dmh ) = shP ((Ch|Dh)∗) = 0 ∀h = 1, . . . , r.
Define G1aux = g0+
∑n
k=1 tkBk(Ak−P (Ak|Bk)), K3aux = D0∨
∨n
k=1Bk.
Using (19) and (22) at the following equality, we obtain G|K3aux =
(G1aux +
∑r
h=1 shDhCh)|K3aux ≥ G1aux|K3aux. Since K3aux ⇒ K, we get
maxG|K ≥ maxG|K3aux ≥ maxG1aux|K3aux ≥ 0. The last inequality
holds by Proposition 4, since all lower probabilities in G1aux|K3aux are
defined in AC , except one (P (C0|D0) = P ((C0|D0)∗) in g0).
In both cases, maxG|K ≥ 0. The thesis follows.

In Propositions 4 and 5, two kinds of extensions are introduced by means of
the GN relation: the lower GN-extension µ(C|D) = µ((C|D)∗) and the upper GN-
extension µ(C|D) = µ((C|D)∗), ∀C|D ∈ E . They correspond to important special
extensions mentioned in Section 2.2. In fact
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Proposition 6. Let P (P ) be a W-coherent, alternatively C-convex lower (up-
per) probability on AC . Then its lower GN-extension (its upper GN-extension)
P (C|D) = P ((C|D)∗) (P (C|D) = P ((C|D)∗)), ∀C|D ∈ E is the natural extension,
alternatively the convex natural extension, of P (of P ) on AC ∪ E.
Proof. It is enough to consider the lower probability case. Let Q be any extension
of P on AC ∪ E which is W-coherent or C-convex if P is so. Then Q(C|D) ≥
Q((C|D)∗) = P ((C|D)∗) = P (C|D), the inequality being ensured by Proposition
2, the first equality because Q = P in AC . Hence the lower GN-extension is the
least-committal W-coherent or C-convex extension of P , a property which identifies
the natural or convex natural extension. 
The result of Proposition 6 is important, as it displays a simple way to find
the natural extension (and the convex natural extension), without performing any
computation. For any additional event C|D, we only have to find (C|D)∗ or (C|D)∗.
This procedure clearly depends on the availability of an initial evaluation on the
set of conditional events AC . This is a special, although not uncommon, case of
probability assessment: it is often customary to evaluate all the events we can obtain
from a given partition or universe IP , i.e. the events of AC(IP ) in the conditional
case.
Example 3. Before the final phase of the 20XY Football World Cup, a Swedish
bookie elicits a W-coherent upper probability P on AC(IP ) as a basis to fix her odds.
Here IP = {B,S, T}, with B = ‘Brazil wins the Cup’, S = ‘Sweden wins the Cup’,
T = ‘A third team wins the Cup’.
Later on during the final phase, the bookie gets to know that event F =‘Brazil is
qualified for the final game’ (and nothing else) is true. Conditional on F , which is
now the largest upper probability for S the bookie can afford, being consistent with
her previous assessment on AC(IP )?
Since S|F /∈ AC(IP ) (F is not logically dependent on IP ), the problem is that
of finding the natural extension of S|F , i.e. P ((S|F )∗) by Proposition 6. Since
(S ∧ F )∗ = S and (¬S ∧ F )∗ = ((B ∨ T ) ∧ F )∗ = B, it ensues that P ((S|F )∗) =
P (S|S ∨B).
As for the lowest consistent upper probability for S|F , it is P (S|F ) = 0, because
(S|F )∗ = ∅|B ∨ T (Proposition 4).
In general, with an assessment µ on a generic set S of conditional events, we
should first extend µ to some AC(IP ) ⊃ S before applying Proposition 5. The GN
relation would therefore be of little help, operationally, while remaining theoretically
meaningful. In fact, it still contributes to explain how logical constraints may
determine our inferences.
GN-extensions play a fundamental role also in detecting the other relevant type
of extensions recalled in Section 2.2, that is upper extensions:
Proposition 7. Given P W-coherent or C-convex on AC , its extension P (C|D) =
P ((C|D)∗) on E = {C|D} is the upper extension of P .
Proof. By Proposition 4 the extension P (C|D) = P ((C|D)∗) is W-coherent or C-
convex if the starting P is, and by Proposition 2 any W-coherent or C-convex
extension Q must satisfy Q(C|D) ≤ Q((C|D)∗) = P ((C|D)∗). 
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Outside the special case of an extension to a single additional event, fixed by
Proposition 7, it is not so simple to determine the upper extension. Moreover, it is
generally no longer unique.
It is also interesting to discuss briefly the effect of Propositions 4 and 5 in the
special case that the uncertainty measure given on AC is a dF-coherent probability
P (·|·). Since P is then both a lower and an upper W-coherent probability, we obtain
easily
Proposition 8. Let P be a dF-coherent probability on AC .
a) Its dF-coherent extensions to an additional event C|D are those and only
those P (C|D) in the closed interval [P ((C|D)∗), P ((C|D)∗)].
b) Its extension P (P ) on an arbitrary set of conditional events E, given by
the lower GN-extension P (C|D) = P ((C|D)∗) (by the upper GN-extension
P (C|D) = P ((C|D)∗)) , ∀C|D ∈ E, is a W-coherent lower (upper) proba-
bility.
Part a), stated in a finite setting in [3], is a conditional framework version of de
Finetti’s Fundamental Theorem of Probability (described in [6], but stated already
in the thirties, see [5]). Also our previous results for imprecise probabilities may be
viewed as generalisations in an imprecise setting of the course of reasoning of the
Fundamental Theorem.
Part b) shows that we can extend P using either the lower or the upper GN-
extension. However, the result is generally not a dF-coherent extension, but a
W-coherent imprecise probability. This is an interesting example of how imprecise
assessments may arise from precise ones.
4. The GN Relation with Imprecise Previsions
In order to justify a generalisation of the GN relation to conditional gambles,
first introduced in [18], let us retrace our steps and reconsider the interpretation of
the GN relation with conditional events.
4.1. More on the GN Relation with Conditional Events. Suppose through-
out this section that A|B ≤GN C|D. As recalled in Section 2.3, a betting argument
has already been discussed in the literature to justify Definition 4. Precisely,
a) whenever B ∧ D is true, we bet both on A|B and on C|D. If we win the
bet on A|B we win also the bet on C|D, and, conversely, losing the bet on
C|D implies losing the bet on A|B.
However, a) is not the only betting implication of A|B ≤GN C|D. To see this, note
that the partition IPg generated by A, B, C, D allows for at most 7 non-impossible
events that imply B∨D.2 This is easily seen from (7), using A⇒ B ↔ A∧¬B = ∅.
The seven events are:
ω1 = A ∧B ∧ C ∧D, ω2 = ¬A ∧B ∧ C ∧D, ω3 = ¬A ∧B ∧ ¬C ∧D;
ω4 = A ∧ ¬B ∧ C ∧D, ω5 = ¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ C ∧D;
ω6 = ¬A ∧B ∧ C ∧ ¬D, ω7 = ¬A ∧B ∧ ¬C ∧ ¬D.
In particular, one of the impossible elements is A∧B ∧¬C ∧D. This feature of
IPg ensures the betting implication in a). In fact, such an implication corresponds
to saying that it can never be the case when B∧D holds, that A is true and C false,
2 We can neglect those events implying ¬B∧¬D because equation (7) is then trivially satisfied.
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and indeed A∧¬C|B∧D = A∧B∧¬C ∧D|B∧D = ∅|B∧D. Note that B∧D =
ω1∨ω2∨ω3 in IPg. What else can we deduce from realising that ¬B∧D = ω4∨ω5?
Because C is true at both ω4 and ω5, we get C|¬B ∧D = C|ω4 ∨ ω5 = Ω|ω4 ∨ ω5.
Hence a second betting effect:
b) whenever ¬B ∧D is true, that is whenever we can bet on C|D while being
not allowed to bet on A|B, our winning the bet on C|D is sure. In fact,
this is the same as betting on C|¬B ∧D = Ω|¬B ∧D.
Similarly, B ∧ ¬D = ω6 ∨ ω7 implies A|B ∧ ¬D = ∅|B ∧ ¬D. Hence, the third
betting consequence:
c) whenever B ∧ ¬D is true, i.e. whenever we can bet on A|B but not on
C|¬D, the bet on A|B is surely lost. In fact, we are actually betting on
A|B ∧ ¬D = ∅|B ∧ ¬D.
Undoubtedly, the additional betting implications from b) and c) are very strong.
They help in understanding why the GN relation may be a very partial order, with
several couples of GN non-comparable conditional events (cf. Remark 2). They also
highlight other aspects of the GN relation, which we cannot neglect when extending
it to conditional gambles.
4.2. The GN relation for conditional gambles. With conditional gambles de-
fined on a partition IP , we introduce the GN relation as follows:
Definition 6. X|B ≤GN Y |D iff, ∀ω ∈ IP ,
(23) IBX(ω) + I¬B∧D(ω) sup
B
X ≤ IDY (ω) + IB∧¬D(ω) inf
D
Y.
To justify this definition, let us verify that its betting implications are analogous
to a), b), c) of the preceding Section 4.1.3
a’) If ω ⇒ B∧D, (23) reduces to X(ω) ≤ Y (ω). This means: whenever we bet
both on X|B and on Y |D, we gain at least as much with the bet on Y |D;
b’) for ω ⇒ ¬B ∧ D, it scales down to supB X = sup{X|B} ≤ Y (ω), hence
sup{X|B} ≤ inf{Y |¬B ∧D}. By the last inequality the gain from betting
on Y |D, i.e. on Y |¬B ∧D in this case, is not less than our (potential) gain
on X|B, had we bet on it;
c’) if ω ⇒ B ∧ ¬D, (23) reduces to X(ω) ≤ infD Y = inf{Y |D}, hence
sup{X|B ∧ ¬D} ≤ inf{Y |D}. The gain from betting on X|B while we
cannot bet on Y |D, i.e. on the gain regarding X|B ∧ ¬D in this case, is
dominated by the (potential) gain on Y |D, had we bet on it.
In a betting perspective, Definition 6 is a generalisation of Definition 3. In a sense,
c’) is even less drastic than c): c’) imposes only a dominance condition against
the gain regarding X|B, while c) asks for a sure loss when betting on A|B. The
differentiation between b’) and b) is similar. Clearly both distinctions depend on
the dichotomic nature of events.
When X, Y are indicators of events, say X = IA, Y = IC , (23) becomes
(24) IA∧B + I¬B∧D max{IA|B} ≤ IC∧D + IB∧¬D min{IC |D}
and it can be shown that (24) describes the GN relation from Definition 3 in a less
immediate but equivalent form:
3 Once again (cf. Footnote 2), we drop the case ω ⇒ ¬B ∧ ¬D, since then (23) holds trivially
in the form 0 ≤ 0.
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Proposition 9. When A|B 6= ∅|B and C|D 6= D|D, A|B ≤GN C|D iff (24) holds.
Proof. Let us suppose A|B ≤GN C|D. Hence ¬C ∧ D ⇒ ¬A ∧ B, which implies
¬B ∧ ¬C ∧D = ∅. We get therefore I¬B∧D = I¬B∧C∧D + I¬B∧¬C∧D = I¬B∧C∧D.
Further, from A ∧ B ⇒ C ∧ D and since A ∧ B ⇒ B, we get also A ∧ B ⇒
B ∧C ∧D, i.e. IA∧B ≤ IB∧C∧D. It follows IA∧B + I¬B∧D max{IA|B} ≤ IB∧C∧D +
I¬B∧C∧D max{IA|B} ≤ IB∧C∧D + I¬B∧C∧D = IC∧D ≤ IC∧D + IB∧¬D min{IC |D}.
Conversely, suppose (24) holds. SinceA|B 6= ∅|B and C|D 6= D|D, max{IA|B} =
1 and min{IC |D} = 0, i.e. (24) becomes IA∧B + I¬B∧D ≤ IC∧D. As an immediate
consequence, we have that IA∧B ≤ IC∧D or, equivalently, A ∧ B ⇒ C ∧ D. To
obtain the second implication in (7), multiply both terms in IA∧B +I¬B∧D ≤ IC∧D
in turn by IB∧¬C∧D first and by I¬B∧D then. We get, respectively, IA∧B∧¬C∧D ≤ 0
and I¬B∧D ≤ I¬B∧C∧D. The first inequality implies A ∧ B ∧ ¬C ∧ D = ∅,
i.e. B ∧ ¬C ∧ D ⇒ ¬A, the second ¬B ∧ ¬C ∧ D = ∅. It follows ¬C ∧ D =
(¬B ∧ ¬C ∧D) ∨ (B ∧ ¬C ∧D) = B ∧ ¬C ∧D ⇒ ¬A ∧B. 
Convention In the sequel, we may and will always assume the non-triviality
conditions X|B 6= ∅|B and Y |D 6= D|D, without restrictions: in the cases we are
ruling out, any uncertainty evaluation is trivial by equation (6).
4.3. Ordering induced by the GN Relation. As a partial ordering among con-
ditional gambles, the generalised GN relation induces an agreeing ordering among
their uncertainty measures whenever they are C-convex or W-coherent imprecise
previsions, or dF-coherent previsions. Since W- and dF-coherence are special cases
of C-convexity, it is enough to establish the result for C-convex previsions.
Proposition 10. Let µ be either a lower (P ) or an upper (P ) C-convex prevision
defined on S ⊇ {X|B, Y |D}. Then,
(25) X|B ≤GN Y |D → µ(X|B) ≤ µ(Y |D).
Proof. Let P be a C-convex lower prevision on S, and consider the special case
n = 1, s0 = s1 = 1, X0|B0 = Y |D, X1|B1 = X|B in Definition 2. Correspondingly,
we obtain G = B(X − P (X|B))−D(Y − P (Y |D)) = IBX − IDY + IDP (Y |D)−
IBP (X|B), using the notation for the indicators of events in the right-hand term
of the second equality. Assume X|B ≤GN Y |D, which ensures by (23)
IBX − IDY ≤ IB∧¬D inf
D
Y − I¬B∧D sup
B
X.
Using the previous inequality, G|B ∨ D ≤ IB∧¬D infD Y − I¬B∧D supB X +
IDP (Y |D) − IBP (X|B)|B ∨ D def= Z|B ∨ D. Since supG|B ∨ D ≥ 0 is necessary
for C-convexity of P , it is also necessary that maxZ|B ∨D ≥ 0. But
Z|B ∨D =

P (Y |D)− P (X|B) at B ∧D
− supB X + P (Y |D) at ¬B ∧D
infD Y − P (X|B) at B ∧ ¬D
Hence, and recalling also that the condition P (X|B) ∈ [infB X, supB X] is necessary
for C-convexity, at least one of the following three sets of inequalities must hold:
P (Y |D) ≥ P (X|B), or P (Y |D) ≥ supB X ≥ P (X|B), or P (Y |D) ≥ infD Y ≥
P (X|B).
In all cases then P (Y |D) ≥ P (X|B) is necessary for C-convexity. An analogue
proof applies to the case of upper C-convex previsions. 
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Discussion. Proposition 10 is the most general result in this paper as for the
ordering induced by the GN relation on an uncertainty measure. Its proof does
not extend to (non-centered) convex previsions, because such previsions may not
satisfy the internality condition P (X|B) ∈ [infB X, supB X].
Yet, Proposition 10 still holds under the weaker requirement that P (P ) is a
(centered) 1-convex lower (upper) prevision. In the case of lower previsions, 1-
convex means that P satisfies a modified version of Definition 2, where ‘for all
n ∈ N’ is replaced by ‘for n = 1’. Proposition 10 holds for 1-convex lower previsions,
because n = 1 in its proof. This kind of previsions has not been investigated yet, to
the best of our knowledge. It extends to conditional gambles the (unconditional)
1-convex lower previsions introduced and studied in [1], Section 4. On their turn,
these encompass the notion of capacity (normalised, 1-monotone measure) in the
case of events, and that of niveloid [7] for gambles. Hence, 1-convex conditional
previsions might correspond to some concept of conditional capacity or niveloid. By
Proposition 10, they seem to be the weakest kind of uncertainty measure agreeing
with the GN-relation.
Still about (centered) 1-convex previsions, note that Proposition 4 holds in the
case they concern conditional events, i.e. when they are 1-convex lower probabili-
ties. Minor modifications are required in its proof as well as observing that Lemma
1 can still be used. Hence, the GN relation ensures a kind of extension theorem for
these imprecise probabilities.
Finally, note that the GN relation induces, in general, no agreeing order on mea-
sures for conditional gambles that extend the consistency concept of avoiding sure
loss (ASL) [20]. It is easy to realise this considering the unconditional case. Already
in this special instance, equation (1) does not necessarily hold if µ is a lower/upper
prevision that avoids sure loss. In our opinion, this is a counterintuitive, if not even
weak aspect of the ASL concept.
4.4. Inequalities with the GN Relation. Stating to what extent the GN rela-
tion in Definition 6 is relevant in extension problems generalising those discussed
in Section 3.1 is an open question at present. However, the GN relation may be
employed in specific instances for getting inequalities on uncertainty evaluations.
We introduce the topic in this section.
Unlike conditional gambles, (conditional) events are always non-negative. It
should be expected then that the inequalities regarding events need some sign
restriction to be extended to gambles, or may even be reversed for non-positive
gambles.
We see this when trying to generalise equation (11) by replacing A with a gamble
X, while still B1 ⇒ B0. From the computations displayed in [18, Example 3] we
know that:
• X|B1 and B1X|B0 are GN-comparable iff inf(X|B1) · sup(X|B1) ≥ 0, i.e.
iff X|B1 cannot take up values of opposite signs.
• More specifically,
(26) B1X|B0 ≤GN X|B1 iff inf(X|B1) ≥ 0
(27) X|B1 ≤GN B1X|B0 iff sup(X|B1) ≤ 0
Clearly, (26) generalises the relation A ∧ B1|B0 ≤GN A|B1, which is a premise to
(11). The opposite relation in (27) holds for non-positive X|B1.
18 RENATO PELESSONI AND PAOLO VICIG
We may obtain two inequalities for C-convex previsions from (26) and (27), by
means of Proposition 10. For instance, when inf(X|B1) ≥ 0 we come to
(28) P (B1X|B0) ≤ P (X|B1),
which extends (11). If further P is W-coherent and P (X|B1) · P (B1|B0) > 0,
equation (28) can be matched with the upper bound (4), getting
(29) P (B1X|B0) ≤ P (X|B1) ≤ P (B1X|B0)/P (B1|B0).
We give a further example of inequality derived using the GN relation and some
elementary properties of W-coherence. Let us make for this the following assump-
tions:
a) A gamble X and a partition IP are given. Further, a W-coherent lower
prevision P is assigned on AC(IP ) ∪ {X|D : D ∈ A(IP ), D 6= ∅}.
b) B is a non-impossible event such that B /∈ AC(IP ).
We would like to bound the uncertainty evaluation of X|B. For this, define the
instrumental gamble Y = X − infB X. Thus, Y |B ≥ 0, Y |B∗ ≥ 0 and, by W-
coherence, P (Y |B∗) ≥ 0.
Suppose now P (X|B∗) > infB X, i.e. P (Y |B∗) > 0.4 Since B∗Y |B ≤ Y |B and
using (4), we may write
(30) P (Y |B) ≥ P (B∗Y |B) ≥ P (B∗|B) · P (Y |B∗).
In the rightmost term of (30) we know P (Y |B∗) = P (X|B∗)− infB X (by a)), but
not P (B∗|B). However, P (B∗|B) ≥ P ((B∗|B)∗) by Proposition 2. Recalling eq.
(15), and since
∨
e∈IP : e⇒B∗∧B
e =
∨
e∈IP : e⇒B∗
e = B∗, we have (B∗|B)∗ = B∗|B∗.
Using these facts in (30), we easily obtain the inequality
(31) P (X|B) ≥ P (B∗|B∗) · P (X|B∗) + P (¬B∗|B∗) · inf
B
X
where the uncertainty evaluations in the right-side term are known.
When P (X|B∗) = infB X, i.e. P (Y |B∗) = 0, (31) holds trivially. In fact, it
reduces to P (X|B) ≥ infB X, a condition implied by W-coherence.
Similar inequalities may be obtained for upper previsions and/or making specific
assumptions.
For instance, if it is further supposed that X|B takes finitely many distinct values
x1, x2, . . . , xn ≥ 0, the following bound holds (see [18]), where ωi = (X = xi):
(32) P (X|B) ≥
n∑
i=1
xiP ((ωi|B)∗).
5. Conclusions
The analysis of the GN relation within Imprecise Probability Theory carried out
in this paper shows that it preserves the basic monotonicity property (equation (1))
of implication towards several kinds of imprecise conditional previsions, including
the (weak) consistency concept of 1-convexity. This latter notion has still to be
focalised for most of its aspects. The role of the GN relation in extension problems
is fixed by the results in Section 3.1, as for conditional events. It largely remains a
topic for future work in the case of conditional gambles.
4 We use here the W-coherence property P (X + h|B) = P (X|B) + h, ∀h ∈ R.
THE GOODMAN-NGUYEN RELATION WITHIN IMPRECISE PROBABILITY THEORY 19
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank the referees for their constructive suggestions.
*NOTICE: This is the authors’ version of a work that was accepted for publi-
cation in the International Journal of Approximate Reasoning. Changes resulting
from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural
formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this doc-
ument. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for
publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in the International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning, vol. 55, issue 8, November 2014, pages 1694-
1707, doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2014.06.002
c© Copyright Elsevier
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0888613X14001017
References
1. Pietro Baroni, Renato Pelessoni, and Paolo Vicig, Generalizing Dutch risk measures through
imprecise previsions, International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based
Systems 17 (2009), no. 2, 153–177.
2. Giulianella Coletti, Angelo Gilio, and Romano Scozzafava, Comparative probability for condi-
tional events: a new look through coherence, Theory and Decision 35 (1993), no. 3, 237–258.
3. Giulianella Coletti and Romano Scozzafava, Characterization of coherent conditional prob-
abilities as a tool for their assessment and extension, International Journal of Uncertainty,
Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 4 (1996), no. 2, 103–127.
4. Bruno de Finetti, La logique de la probabilite´, Actes du Congre`s International de Philoso-
phie Scientifique, vol. IV, Hermann Paris, 1936, English version: The logic of probability,
Philosophical Studies 77, pp. 181–190,1995, pp. 1–9.
5. , La pre´vision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives, Annales de l’Institut Henri
Poincare´ 7 (1937), no. 1, 1–68 (eng), English version: Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjec-
tive Sources, in Breakthroughs in Statistics, volume I, pp. 134-174, Springer, 1992.
6. , Theory of Probability, Wiley, New York, 1974.
7. Szymon Dolecki and Gabriele H. Greco, Niveloids, Topological Methods in Nonlinear Analysis
5 (1995), no. 1.
8. Hans Fo¨llmer and Alexander Schied, Convex measures of risk and trading constraints, Finance
and Stochastics 6 (2002), no. 4, 429–447.
9. Angelo Gilio and Giuseppe Sanfilippo, Quasi conjunction, quasi disjunction, t-norms and
t-conorms: Probabilistic aspects, Information Sciences 245 (2013), 146 – 167.
10. Irwin R. Goodman and Hung T. Nguyen, Conditional objects and the modeling of uncer-
tainties, Fuzzy Computing (M. Gupta and T. Yamakawa, eds.), Elsevier (North-Holland),
Amsterdam, 1988, pp. 119–138.
11. Irwin R. Goodman, Hung T. Nguyen, and Elbert A. Walker, Conditional inference and logic
for intelligent systems: A theory of measure-free conditioning, Elsevier (North-Holland), Am-
sterdam, 1991.
12. Silvano Holzer, On coherence and conditional prevision, Boll. Un. Mat. Ital.C (6) Serie VI 4
(1985), no. 1, 441–460.
13. Peter Milne, Bruno de Finetti and the logic of conditional events, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 48 (1997), no. 2, 195–232.
14. , Bets and boundaries: assigning probabilities to imprecisely specified events, Studia
Logica 90 (2008), no. 3, 425–453.
15. Renato Pelessoni and Paolo Vicig, Uncertainty modelling and conditioning with convex impre-
cise previsions, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 39 (2005), no. 2–3, 297–319.
16. , Bayes’ theorem bounds for convex lower previsions, Journal of Statistical Theory and
Practice 3 (2009), no. 1, 85–101.
17. , Williams coherence and beyond, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50
(2009), no. 4, 612–626.
20 RENATO PELESSONI AND PAOLO VICIG
18. , The Goodman-Nguyen relation in uncertainty measurement, Synergies of Soft Com-
puting and Statistics for Intelligent Data Analysis (R. Kruse, M. R. Berthold, C. Moewes,
M. A´. Gil, P. Grzegorzewski, and O. Hryniewicz, eds.), Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013,
pp. 37–44.
19. Renato Pelessoni, Paolo Vicig, and Marco Zaffalon, Inference and risk measurement with
the pari-mutuel model, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010), no. 9,
1145–1158.
20. Peter Walley, Statistical reasoning with imprecise probabilities, Chapman and Hall London,
1991.
21. Kurt Weichselberger, Elementare grundbegriffe einer allgemeineren wahrscheinlichkeitsrech-
nung i: Intervallwahrscheinlichkeit als umfassendes konzept, vol. 1, Physica Verlag, Heidel-
berg, 2001.
22. Peter M Williams, Notes on conditional previsions, International Journal of Approximate
Reasoning 44 (2007), no. 3, 366–383.
DEAMS “B. de Finetti”, University of Trieste, Piazzale Europa 1, I-34127 Trieste,
Italy
E-mail address: renato.pelessoni@econ.units.it
DEAMS “B. de Finetti”, University of Trieste, Piazzale Europa 1, I-34127 Trieste,
Italy
E-mail address: paolo.vicig@econ.units.it
